The study investigates the relationship between CEO compensation and performance of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in South Africa, using data for the period 2009 to 2011. The results indicated that there exist no positive relationship between CEO compensation and SOEs performance as measured by return on assets. The results also indicated a positive relationship between CEO compensation (base salary) and the size of SOEs as measured by total revenue and number of employees. The results suggest that board members of SOEs in South Africa should hold CEOs accountable for the performance of SOEs, and should not pay huge salaries and bonuses to non performing CEOs.
Introduction
The issue of the gap between the remuneration paid to company directors and that paid to other employees has, in recent times, made headlines in the international media. The chief executive officers (CEOs) of the 15 largest companies in the United States were reported to have earned 520 times more than the average worker in 2007 (International Labour Organisation (IOL), 2008). A study conducted by PwC (2011) of the top 40 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) revealed that the median pay of executive directors has increased by 23.3% to R4.8 million in 2010. This, of course, has significantly increased the wage gap between executives and ordinary company employees. Two cases in point are the salary increases of 109% paid to Eskom executives (Business Day, 2011) and the 81% increase for Sasol's directors (Politicsweb, 2011); both these increases prompted labour unions to embark on a violent strike, with members demanding that their wage increases matched those of their managers.
In the United States the Securities and Exchange Commission set tighter rules towards the end of 2006 for corporate proxies -these rules require that more information be provided about the methods used to compile pay packages for top management (Jeppson, Smith and Stone, 2009 ). In 2007, the average overall compensation for chief executives at 200 large companies that had filed proxies in the United States approached $12 million. Recent reports in Kenya, which state that pay increases have pushed civil servants ahead of private sector (TradeMark SA, 2012), have added fuel to the debate on remuneration paid to executives, especially executives of state owned enterprises. Unlike private companies, state owned enterprises (SOEs) receive the bulk of their revenue from the Treasury (the tax payer) and are supposed to serve the public. However, the remuneration of top executives in SOEs seems to be competing with that of private companies, resulting in consumers paying high tariffs in SOEs such as Eskom when, in fact, these consumers should be benefiting from the subsidy paid to Eskom by the Treasury.
In the UK, the Chief Secretary to the Treasurer announced on 12 February 2012 that there would be a review into all public sector bonuses in order to ensure that bonuses would only be paid for ‗genuine excellence' and that ‗there is no reward for failure‖ in publicly funded bodies (Winnet and Kirkup, 2012) .
Given all this, the question arises: does the compensation of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) reflect company performance in South Africa? To be more specific: is there a relationship between the compensation of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the performance of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in South Africa?
To date, the empirical studies used to confirm or reject relationships between CEO compensation and company performance have principally used data from listed companies in the USA, UK, Australia, Japan and other emerging or transitional economies. Little or no study has been conducted using data from state owned enterprises. The purpose of this paper is to help fill the gap, and to add to the existing body of literature on the topic of executive compensation by investigating the relationship between CEO compensation and performance of SOEs in South Africa. To this end, we shall use data for the period 2009 to 2011. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: firstly, a literature study presents the theoretical foundation of the study related to CEO remuneration and company performance. Secondly, we shall then outline the sample, variables and methodology used. Thirdly, we shall analyse the data and, lastly, we shall present the results of this analysis and put forward our recommendations.
Literature review
According to Agency Theory, an agency problem exists when an agent, such as a CEO, has established an agenda that conflicts with the interests of the stockholders (Attaway, 2000) . Lilling (2006) states that the CEO is the agent, while the shareholders are the principles. The agent (CEO) is looking after his or her best interests: in other words, he or she wants to get paid as much as possible. On the other hand, the principles (shareholders) own a stake in the company, and want the company to perform as best as it can. The board members must find a way to compensate the CEO so that he or she is amply rewarded if the company performs well. One way to avoid agency problems would be to reward executives on the basis of financial returns to shareholders. Mallin (2007) explains that the economic literature demonstrates that the compensation received by senior management should be linked to company performance for economic reasons. However, given the salary increases paid to executives, shareholders are now convinced that there is no connection between executive pay and corporate performance (Attaway, 2000) . In fact, shareholders should be the focal group whose interests are furthered by designing executive salary arrangements that result in a high-performance company. According to Bruce, Buck and Main (2005) , the key factor in effecting this outcome is pay-performance sensitivity.
Unlike private and public companies, the major shareholder in SOEs is the government. In South Africa, SOEs are defined in terms of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), 1 of 1999. There are two main categories of SOEs in South Africa, those that fall directly under the Department of Public Enterprises and those that do not fall directly under this Department. There are currently nine SOEs that fall directly under the Department of Public Enterprises. The South African government, as the major shareholder of SOEs that fall directly under the Department of Public Enterprise, is responsible for the appointment of board members. The CEO is thus appointed by the Minister of Public Enterprises after recommendations from board members and after consultation with the Cabinet. In order to prevent the abuse of power by the ruling party and to prevent cadre deployment, the National Planning Commission headed by the Minister in the Presidency made a proposal that the power to appoint CEOs in SOEs should be removed from the Minister of Public Enterprises and given to the Board of Directors (Shoba, 2011 Jeppson, Smith and Stone (2009) also conducted a study on the relationship between CEO compensation and company performance. The study used change in net income, percentage change in net income, and total revenue as measures of company performance. The results of this study revealed that no strong relationship existed between CEO compensation and company performance in terms of variable change in net income and percentage change in net income; however, the study also revealed the existence of a significant relationship with total revenue.
Studies conducted in South Africa on the relationship between CEO remuneration and company performance are scanty. However, in 2009, Scholtz conducted a study on share options as part of executive remuneration. As a result of his study, he proposed changes at internal governance level in order to align executive remuneration with the interests of stakeholders. Theunissen (2010) conducted a study on remuneration and benefits of the directors of State owned enterprises. He recommended that remuneration should be distributed more equally (i.e. throughout all ranks of employees) because an SEO's performance is the result of work done by all employees, not just the CEO.
Research objectives
The objective of the study was to investigate the relationship between CEO compensation and performance of SOEs in South Africa, using data for the period 2009 to 2011. Data was obtained from SOEs that fall directly under the Department of Public Enterprises and an equal number of SOEs that do not fall directly under this Department. The study tested the relationship between SOE performance and CEO compensation using premises and variables that have been used in prior studies. The study aimed to build on previous studies conducted into the relationship between CEO compensation and company performance, with particular reference to Jeppson 
Research methodology

Data, variables, and hypotheses
The study population consisted of all nine SOEs that fall directly under the Department of Public Enterprises and all SOEs that do not fall directly under this Department. Secondary data used in the empirical study was acquired from SOE annual reports for the years 2009 to 2011, thus providing the researchers with three years of uninterrupted observations. The data for a particular SOE was included in the test sample only if the following two conditions were met. First, the data for each dependent and independent variables had to be available for each of the three years covered by the study. Second, each SOE had to be managed by the same CEO for the entire duration of the study. Attaway, 2000 (citing Madura et al., 1996 suggests that, for the study to be able to determine whether CEO compensation is linked to company performance, the same CEO should be in place during the period in which performance is measured. Due to the fact that most SOEs were not managed by the same CEO for the entire period under review, the sampling frame of this study was thus limited to five SOEs that fall directly under the Department of Public Enterprises and five selected SOEs that do not fall directly under this Department, thus resulting in a total sample frame of ten SOEs.
Definition of variables
Variables used to measure SOE performance
Company performance has been analysed in different ways by different researchers. Most studies (see Attaway, 2000; Izan, Sidhu and Taylor, 1998) used profitability, share performance, or shareholder equity (ROE) to measure company performance. However, others (Canarella and Gasparyanm, 2008; Lilling, 2006) used return on assets (ROA) as proxy to measure company performance. Attaway (2000) argues that the use of profitability as a measure of company performance is subject to criticism, simply because profitability may not reflect the company's real value (because executives can manipulate profitability indicators). Attaway (2000) further argues that executives can do this by manipulating the depreciation policy (accelerated versus straight-line), changing inventory valuation procedures (FIFO versus LIFO), using short-term, non-capitalised lease to obtain productive equipment, and using ‗window-dressing techniques' such as holding borrowed money as cash until the end of the financial year to make the balance sheet look good.
Hagel, Brown and Davidson (2010) concur with Attaway (2000) by arguing that return on equity (ROE) is not the best way to measure company performance, because this places the focus on returns given to company shareholders. They further argue that companies can resort to certain financial strategies to artificially maintain a healthy return on equity (ROE) and hide the company's deteriorating performance in terms of actual business fundamentals. For example, growing debt leverage and share buybacks funded through accumulated cash can help a company's ROE, even though its operational profitability is eroding. Given this, according to Hagel, Brown and Davidson (2010), ROA is a better ratio for measuring financial performance, because it takes into account the assets used to support the company's activities.
Further reasons for using the ROA instead of the ROE is that the Department of Public Enterprises has argued that the performance of SOEs should not be judged using the standard applicable to the private sector (i.e. whereby dividends are declared to shareholders). Indeed, the Department decided that SOEs were not obliged to declare dividends. They argued that revenue or profit should be -reinvested‖ in infrastructure development and other commercial activities that they are involved in order to strengthen their balance sheets with a view to increase their access to the capital markets, and thereby reduce their dependence on the fiscus (Ensor, 2011; Shoba, 2011) . For the purpose of this study, ROA is defined in two ways: firstly, it is defined as the percentage of corporate return on assets or the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to average total assets (ROA 1 ). Secondly, ROA is also defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (ROA 2 ).
Size of SOE
According to Crumley (2008) , one of the most important influences of compensation, according to the literature, is the size of the company. The size of the company is measured by its book value of assets, level of sales and number of employees (Crumley, 2008) . Lilliang (2006) agrees with Crumley (2008) , and states that the most commonly used measure of the size of a company is its sales volume and number of employees. In this study, annual total turnover, value of total assets, and number of employees were used to measure the size of SOEs.
Variables used to measure CEO compensation
Due to the fact that benefits paid to CEOs differed from one SOE to another, total compensation was thus limited to base salary plus cash bonus only. Also, because the annual cash bonus was not paid regularly during the duration of the study, dummy variables were used, with 1 indicating that a bonus was paid to the CEO, and 0 indicating that no bonus was paid to the CEO.
Hypotheses
The literature (i.e. in the discipline of Economics) argues that, for sound financial reasons, compensation awarded to senior management should be linked to company performance (Malin, 2007) . In order to investigate whether CEO compensation in SOEs concurs with what is said in the literature, the following seven hypotheses were tested:
HO: 1 -A positive relationship does not exist between SOE performance as measured by the return on assets (ROA) and CEO compensation (base salary plus cash bonus). HO: 2 -A positive relationship does not exist between the size of SOEs as measured by total revenue (in Rands) and CEO compensation (base salary plus cash bonus). HO: 3 -A positive relationship does not exist between the size of SOEs as measured by total revenue (in Rands) and CEO compensation (base salary only). HO: 4 -A positive relationship does not exist between the size of SOEs as measured by total assets (in Rands) and CEO compensation (base salary and cash bonus). HO: 5 -A positive relationship does not exist between the size of SOEs as measured by total assets (in Rands) and CEO compensation (base salary only).
HO: 6 -A positive relationship does not exist between the size of SOEs as measured by number of employees and CEO compensation (base salary and cash bonus). HO: 7 -A positive relationship does not exist between the size of SOEs as measured by number of employees and CEO compensation (base salary only).
All these hypotheses were tested using Pearson Product-Moment Correlation and linear least squares regression analysis. Table 1 Based on the above results, it is clear that there is a large variation in some of the variables. Only the variation of the total sample (Panel C) will be explained. CEO total compensation varies from a minimum of R1 081 000 to a maximum of R5 764 000. Similarly, return on assets varies from a minimum of-14.0% to a maximum of 4.9% (ROA 1 ), and -12.6% to a maximum of 62.8% (ROA 2 ). Total turnover varies between R127 517 726 and R364 74 000 000, and number of employees varies between 178 and 23 520. These variations indicate that there are significant differences between the maximum and the minimum values, but they do not explain the reasons for the variability of the values.
Results
shows the descriptive statistics for this study. These statistics are divided into three panels: Panel A depicts the results of SOEs that fall directly under the Department of Public Enterprises, Panel B depicts the results of SOEs that do not fall directly under this Department, while Panel C depicts the results of the descriptive statistics of all samples.for this study. The final sample for 2009 to 2011 data set consisted of 5 SOEs that fall directly under the Department of Public Enterprises (resulting in 15 observations), 5 SOEs that do not fall directly under this Department (also resulting in 15 observations), and 10 SOEs for the total sample (resulting in 30 observations). The descriptive statistics are presented in three panels: Panel A represents SOEs that fall directly under the Department of Public Enterprises
Regression analysis
The result of the Pearson Correlation was omitted in this study because no significant correlation was observed . Regression was thus used to predict CEO compensation and SOE performance using the variable ROA 2 . The results of ROA 1 were not analysed, since they revealed no correlation with other variables. The variable ROA 2 will now be referred to as ROA in the following paragraphs. Regression was also used to test whether there is a positive relationship between CEO total compensation (base salary plus annual cash bonus), CEO compensation (base salary only), and the size of the SOE (total revenue, total assets, and number of employees). Table 3 depicts the regression analysis of both the dependent variable (ROA) and the independent variable (CEO total compensation). The regression results of Hypothesis 1 shown in Table 4 reflects an R-square of 0.000 for Panel A, 0.034 for Panel B, and 0.005 for Panel C, which is the correlation coefficient squared. It is interpreted as the proportion of the total variation of 0 for Panel A, 3.4% for Panel B, and 0.5% for Panel C of the value of CEO compensation explained by the ratio return on assets (ROA). Since these percentages are low, this suggests that CEO total compensation for SOEs is not dependent on the ROA ratio. Table  4 depicts the regression analysis of the dependent variable (total revenue in Rands) and the independent variable (CEO total compensation). The regression results of Hypothesis 2 shown in Table 4 Table 5 depicts the regression analysis of the dependent variable (total revenue in Rands) and the independent variable (CEO compensation -base salary). The regression results of Hypothesis 3 shown in Table 5 reflects an R-square of 0.365 for Panel A, 0.060 for Panel B, and 0.180 for panel C, which is the correlation coefficient squared. It is interpreted as the proportion of the total variation, or 36.5% for Panel A, 6% for Panel B, and 18% for Panel C of the value of CEO compensation explained by the total revenue (in Rands). The total variation for Panel A is slightly higher (36.5%). The correlation coefficient (R) is 0.604, and the ANOVA value is 0.017. The total variation for Panel C is 18%, the correlation coefficient (R) is 0.424, and the ANOVA value is 0.020. The total variation for Panel A (6%) is the lowest, the correlation coefficient (R) is 0.244, and the ANOVA value is 0.380. Hypothesis 3 is therefore rejected. A positive relationship does exist between CEO compensation (base salary) and the size of SOEs as measured by total revenue. Table 6 depicts the regression analysis of both the dependent variable (total assets in Rands) and the independent variable (CEO total compensation). Table 6 . Regression analysis of both the dependent (total assets) and independent The results of the regression summary of Hypothesis 4 shown in Table 6 reflect an R-square of 0.017 for Panel A, 0.049 for Panel B, and 0.036 for panel C, which is the correlation coefficient squared. It is interpreted as the proportion of the total variation, or 1.7% for Panel A, 4.9% for Panel B, and 3.6% for Panel C of the value of CEO compensation explained by the total assets. Since these percentages are low, this suggests that CEO compensation is not dependent on total assets.
The Table 7 depicts the regression analysis of both the dependent variable (total assets in Rands) and the independent variable (CEO compensation -base salary). Table 7 . Regression analysis of both the dependent (total assets) and the independent (CEO compensation -base salary) variable The regression results of Hypothesis 5 shown in Table 7 Table 8 depicts the regression analysis of both the dependent variable (number of employees) and the independent variable (CEO total compensation). The regression results of Hypothesis 6 shown in Table 8 Table 9 depicts the regression analysis of both the dependent variable (number of employees) and the independent variable (CEO compensationbase salary). The regression results of Hypothesis 7 shown in Table 9 reflect an R-square of 0.296 for Panel A, 0.068 for Panel B, and 0.164 for panel C, which is the correlation coefficient squared. It is interpreted as the proportion of the total variation, or 29.6% for Panel A, 6.8% for Panel B, and 16.4% for Panel C of the value of CEO compensation explained by the total revenue (in Rands). The total variation for Panel A is slightly higher (29.6%) the correlation coefficient (R) is 0.544, and the ANOVA value is 0.036 (< 0.005). The total variation for Panel C (16.4%), the correlation coefficient (R), is 0.405, and the ANOVA value is 0.026 (<0.005). The total variation for Panel B (6.8%) is the lowest, the correlation coefficient (R) is 0.260, and the ANOVA value is 0.349 (> 0.005). Hypothesis 7 is therefore rejected for Panel A and C. A positive relationship does exist between CEO compensation (base salary) and the size of SOEs as measured by number of employees. Table 7 depicts the summary of the results. The second limitation is that benefits paid to CEO in the selected sample frame were not the same. Some SOEs, for example, included base salary, allowances, bonus, and other contributions as part of CEO total compensation, while others included only the base salary and bonus, and yet others paid the CEO the base salary only with no bonus or other perks. In order to be consistent, therefore, only the base salary and the cash bonus was taken into consideration as CEO total compensation, and dummies were used in cases where the cash bonus was not paid during certain years of the duration of the study.
Conclusion
One of the major roles of CEOs is to motivate employees and to provide leadership in the company's attempts to achieve its objectives. In order to ensure maximum performance from CEOs, the board members must find a way to compensate the CEO so that, if the company performs exceptionally well, the CEO will be paid accordingly. The objective of this study was to examine the relationship between CEO compensation and SOE performance in South Africa. A sample of five SOEs that fall directly under the Department of Public Enterprises and five SOEs that do not fall directly under this Department was selected, resulting in a total sample of ten SOEs.
The results of the analysis indicated that a positive relationship does not exist between CEO compensation and SOE performance as measured by return on assets (ROA). This is in contrast with the results of the study conducted by Lilling (2006) , Merhebi, Pattenden, Swan and Zhou (2006), and Canarella and Gasparyan (2008) , all of whom also used the ROA as the criterion for measuring company performance and found a positive relationship. The results also contradict statements made in the literature, which says that compensation received by senior management should be linked to company performance for economic reasons (Mallin, 2007) . The reasons for the deviation from similar studies and from statements made in the literature might be based on the following reasons. The first reason for the deviation might be the fact that SOEs are agencies which exist to provide a service to the public without making a profit. Secondly, SOEs receive a subsidy from the government and most of the SOEs surveyed had a deficit in total revenue (negative total revenue).
The results of the study also found that a positive relationship exists between CEO compensation (base salary) and the size of SOEs as measured by total revenue (in Rands), and also by number of employees. 
Managerial implication and recommendations
Although we expected to find a positive relationship between COE compensation and company performance, we did not find this to be the case in this study when using the ratio return on asset (ROA) as proxy to measure SOE performance. Even though the objective of SOEs is not to make profit, but to provide the public with a service at a reasonable rate, it is important for management to ensure that asset usage is maximised in order to yield a good return on investment (so that SOEs receive sufficient turnover to be able to sustain their operations without being too dependent on government grants and subsidies).
It was also noted that only SOEs that fall directly under the Department of Public Enterprises reveal a positive relationship between CEO compensation (base salary) and the size of SOEs as measured by total revenue and number of employees. However, the same relationship could not be seen in SOEs that do not fall directly under this Department. This is a cause for concern, because all SOEs receive grants and subsidies from the government and there should be no disparity in their performance. The Board of Directors should therefore investigate the reason for such disparity and implement the necessary intervention.
Lastly, it is further recommended that the Board of Directors in SOEs should hold CEOs accountable for their performance and stop paying them huge salaries and bonuses when a SOE is not performing. The Board of Directors of SOEs in South Africa should follow the example set up by the Chief Secretary to the Treasurer in the UK, who announced a review towards the end of 2006 into all public sector bonuses to ensure that bonuses should only be paid for ‗genuine excellence' and that ‗there is no reward for failure' in publicly funded bodies (The Daily Telegraph, 2012).
